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Introduction
The upsurge in Chinese migration to Africa over the past decade began drawing considerable local attention some years ago but went largely unnoticed by the outside world. Scholarly interest in this phenomenon, which is summarized below, has been more recent. Do Chinese migrant networks have specific cultural traits that favor their economic competitiveness relative to African cultures? Or is the supposed effectiveness of Chinese migrant entrepreneurs, admired by some groups and envied by others, just a characteristic feature of any trading diaspora? Are its members perhaps more inclined-or forced, according to their circumstances-to be innovative drivers of change, if only in order to survive in a foreign, sometimes even hostile social environment? After all, economic migrants are perceived by most people worldwide as more enterprising and adventurous than the ordinary human being who stays at home to earn his or her living.
The third set of questions is as follows: What kind of linkage or relationship (if any) exists between both migrant groups? That is, how do the two groups interact? Do they fight or ignore one another, or do they meet each other on a level playing field? Does the supposedly cut-throat competition, including all its allegedly negative effects on indigenous development in Africa, exist, or are both groups rather complementary?
All of these questions are investigated in the following exploratory study, based mostly on a review of the literature, which is focused on a small but important part of the universe of Chinese and African trading diasporas in West Africa, a center of attraction for Chinese migrants in the past decade. 2 The following comparative study of migrant entrepreneurs in the capitals of Benin (Cotonou) and Ghana (Accra), both intimately linked to the regional superpower Nigeria in various ways, provides initial answers to these questions. Cotonou is a transit hub for the mainly informal trade with Nigeria and a cradle of the mushrooming informal institutions of both immigrant groups; Accra is an emerging regional subpower alongside Nigeria in Anglophone West Africa. The study simultaneously addresses the general issue of the sociocultural roots of development and the perpetual adaptation of these roots to the actual setting in which informal institutions are embedded.
A holistic understanding of the linkage between culture and development is provided by the underlying rationale of the concept of cultures of innovation, as developed by UNESCO (2004) and scholars such as D'Orville (2004) and others (Kohnert 2006) . Schumpeter's distinction between "innovation" and "invention" is crucial to our understanding of cultures of innovation as it focuses on the dissemination and implementation of inventions, 2 In a second stage, empirical case studies within the framework of a larger research project will generate a more robust database for analysis. The database will include empirical analysis of the multifaceted interaction of these innovative cultures, both among themselves and with the cultural environment of the host countries, with regard to their potential for innovative impulses. In addition, the question of the stratum-specific characteristics of cultures of entrepreneurialism, as well as possible gender-specific elements within and beyond cultural borders shall be taken into account. (ʹEntrepreneurial Chinese Migrants in Urban West Africa -The Impacts of Intercultural Interactionʹ. Proposed research project, GIGA Hamburg, 2011-13).
processes that are not just driven by the strong will of a charismatic individual entrepreneur but also stimulated by the economic, political and cultural institutional framework of a society (Schumpeter 1934 (Schumpeter [1912 ; Swedberg 2002) . Thus, cultures of innovation are informal institutions, which are often based on shared values or value systems. They fulfill important orientation, motivation, coordination, and legitimization roles in the actual performance of innovation processes (Heidenreich 2001; Shane 1993; Hofstede 2003) . The concept provides a methodological framework for the delimitation and analysis of elements and strategies of innovative cultural agency. Cultures of innovation depend on space-, time-and context-specific frameworks. They are a significant part of multiple modernities, which are influenced by globalization, transnational networks and social spaces (Featherstone 2007; Hahn and Klute 2008; Pries 2001; Robertson 1995; Sassen 2001; . The innovative cultures of migrants are shaped by the changing requirements of informal institutions in their respective African host communities, to which they have to adapt in order to survive (Meagher 2007; .
For our purposes, I define cultures of innovation as relatively stable modes of cognition, behavior and social organization which are directed towards development. 3 Within the framework of African cultures, the unjustified reduction of cultural economics to Western standards of reason and rational choice, against which Stephen Marglin and others have already cautioned (Marglin 2009: 295-296; Kohnert 2007) , should be avoided.
Examples of cultures of innovation are to be found in different realms: religion is obviously one of them, as Max Weber's famous thesis about the Protestant ethic as the spirit of capitalism suggested. A more recent example is provided by a case study of new Christian and Islamic movements as the modernizing forces behind Nigerian informal entrepreneurs (Meagher 2009 ). Ethnic networks of migrant entrepreneurs or the cultural foundations of trading diasporas as drivers of modernization are other examples, as demonstrated in another study on Igbo informal enterprise and national cohesion from below (Meagher 2009a) .
Within the field of politics, the sovereign National Conferences which mushroomed in Francophone Africa as drivers of transition in the early 1990s represented another innovative culture, although the outcome was not always that convincing, as in the model case of Benin (Kohnert 2006) .
Migrant communities' cultures of innovation are often embedded in the broader social setting of "ethnic entrepreneurship" (Volery 2007: 30-31) . However, both concepts are clearly distinctive in scope, aim, and methodology. The most notable conceptual advantage of the concept of ethnic or cultural entrepreneurship is the introduction of a transnational dimension (Zhou 2004 (Zhou : 1054 (Zhou -60, 1066 . The latter suggests that migrant entrepreneurs are characterized by a "mixed embeddedness" in distinctive cultural spheres: their own "traditional" cul-3 Our concept of "development" follows a holistic approach, as presented by Amartya Sen (2004: 2,3) : "In one form or another, culture engulfs our lives, our desires, our frustrations, our ambitions, and the freedoms that we seek. The freedom and opportunity for cultural activities are among the basic freedoms the enhancement of which can be seen to be constitutive of development" (Sen, 2004: 3). (Volery 2007: 35) . This transnational dimension has also been underlined in the critiques of methodological nationalism with respect to migration theories (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2008; Beck 2007; Chernilo 2006; Wimmer and Schiller 2002; Sassen 2006 ). In any case, trading diasporas, in order to become effective and sustainable, need an ideology, a symbolic blueprint for their organization, as Abner Cohen rightly asserts in his seminal publication on the cultural strategies of trading diasporas (Cohen 1971) . This ideology is most often based on the creation of myths of belonging, including rules regarding rewards and sanctions. All this has developed through "a long process of trial and error, of cultural innovations and of mediation and symbolic formulation" (Cohen 1971: 276) .
The article's conceptual framework or methodology is based on a comparative approach and a literature review. The latter has been complemented by an analysis of data available in the African media and on the Internet on the comparative characteristics of the innovation cultures of both the African and the Chinese ethnic migrant communities. Taken together, this information constitutes the basis for hypotheses generation and testing.
In order to perform a methodologically sound comparison of different ethnic groups of migrant entrepreneurs and to discern their distinctive innovative cultures, it is important to make evaluations on a level playing field. That is, both ethnic trading diasporas should ideally be implanted in an identical foreign environment (host country) and studied at the same time in order to allow for meaningful comparisons and, last but not least, to reduce as far as possible the often unknown external intervening factors. In general, to stress it once again, one should pay due attention to the transnational social spaces in which these migrant networks are embedded. Assessing and isolating the impact of cultures of innovation on development becomes even more difficult in view of the possible counteracting influences of other significant factors. The most significant of these factors is probably the global trend of neoliberal economic and political reforms in recent decades, promoted by the international donor community, combined with state neglect, most notably in Africa, both of which shape the performance of entrepreneurial networks through complex interactions (Meagher 2010: 166) .
My first working hypothesis, derived from the following literature review, is that the competition between Chinese and Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs does not necessarily lead to the suspected cut-throat rivalry or hostility, which is supposedly reinforced by the impact of globalization in general and the recent worldwide financial crisis in particular. Under certain conditions, competition may spur the development of specific but complementary cultures of innovation. A strong capacity to adapt to the rapidly changing living conditions and business opportunities in their host country is the basis for the survival and success of both groups of migrants. Nevertheless, according to my second hypothesis, the business strategies and modes of survival of these two groups differ significantly according to the demands of their home community, the transnational diaspora, and the host country in which they are meant to integrate. According to my third hypothesis, the cultural underpinnings of migrant drivers of change are not restricted to, nor necessarily dominated by, inherited customs or religions such as the revival of Confucianism (Pairault 2007) , Pentecostalism (Kamphausen 2000) , or Vodun. They are permanently and creatively adapted and invented anew by transnational migrant networks in the globalized world in order to suit the specific needs of these migrant communities. However, until now there has only been scanty evidence available to prove these points, and if they are discussed at all in scholarly sources, the issue nevertheless remains a source of debate.
The article is structured according to the three sets of key questions mentioned above, with a regional focus on West Africa: Following the literature review in the second section, I
analyze the first question, whether the new Chinese migrants in Africa are to be considered as drivers of change, in Section 3, using the example of Chinese entrepreneurial migrants in Ghana and in Benin Republic. In Section 4 I then undertake a comparison of the Chinese and Nigerian trading diasporas-again in Ghana and Benin. The linkage or interaction between both migrant groups is discussed in Section 5, and this discussion is followed by a conclusion.
Comparing Chinese and African Business Cultures in Sub-Saharan Africa:

Literature Review
The remarkable growth of Chinese-African trade in the past ten years has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. As early as 2006, an OECD study envisaged the new Asian giants-China and India-as growth models for Africa, although it cautioned about possible negative effects on resource allocation, governance (rent-seeking), and poverty reduction (Lyons and Brown 2009; Goldstein et al. 2006) . In 2007 China became Africa's second most important trading partner, just behind the USA and before France (Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2009: 45) . Most studies have so far focused on the macroeconomic or political effects of the circulation of goods and capital on this new "silk road to Africa" (Broadman 2007 ). The accompanying circulation of labor has received less attention. Apparently, the growing Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa has primarily involved small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which are said to be driven by a strong entrepreneurial spirit and ethos (Gu 2009: 574) . Now even Chinese management consultants for Chinese SMEs regularly tour Africa. Some, like Wang Wenning, one of China's most important executive consultants, and incidentally director of Africa Invest, the only Chinese consultancy firm dealing exclusively with Africa, are envied by their Western peers for their outstanding success (Blume 2008) . Until now most scholarly studies have focused on macro or national levels of analysis (Broadman 2007; Asche and Schüller 2008) . However, to the or- Based on comparative studies of Chinese and African business cultures in Kenya, Alexandra Gadzala (2009: 205-06) maintains that Chinese guanxi networks of SMEs have a competitive edge over their Kenyan counterparts. The manifold ethnic divisions of African countries and subsequent cleavages between ethnic groups preclude, so it is said, effective interethnic collaboration and the forging of horizontal ties among African entrepreneurs. The latter, however, are said to be typical of Chinese SMEs because of their cultural homogeneity, although this homogeneity in turn hinders the SMEs' ability to connect with partners beyond their immediate networks (ibid.: 206). Because guanxi networks are based on interpersonal trust within highly circumscribed exclusive networks, the maintenance of one's own "face" is said to be of much greater importance than it is within African networks. Moreover, Chinese trust relations are characterized by the abiding nature of long-term obligations, as opposed to the supposed immediacy generally expected in African networks (ibid.: 205-06 ).
Yet the alleged differences between Chinese and African cultural networks as described by Gadzala are questionable. Many of the particularities of distinct guanxi networks she describes are strongly reminiscent of the long-standing scholarly discussion about African ethnic patronage relations, which are neither primordial nor divisive but instead continually adapted to modern requirements and guided by a sophisticated social fabric of both bridging and bonding, which aids in cross-cultural exchange (Meagher 2005: 227) . This corresponds with the view of those China watchers who contest the argument that guanxi is something unique to Chinese culture. They consider it to be little more than a Chinese word for social networks and social capital, both of which can be identified in the informal sectors of many developing societies (Gold et al. 2002: 3) . In addition, it is by no means clear to what extent these guanxi networks are liable to change or whether they adapt to new local environments (ibid.: 4). Nor has the way in which they influence African networks under the prevailing conditions of globalization been investigated. The latter question concerns the question of whether a merger of the positive business-enhancing aspects of both cultures gradually takes place, or whether Chinese ventures have reinforcing, neutral or negative effects on African business practices (Pratt 2009: 40) .
In a study based on data from the Regional Program on Enterprise Development including Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania, V. Ramachandran and M.K. Shah (1999) arrive at the conclusion that overseas Chinese (or Indian) entrepreneurs in Africa start out larger and grow significantly more quickly than local African firms. The authors argue that Asian minority entrepreneurs have access to informational and financial networks that provide better access to credit, information, and technology for their members than those of their African counterparts. Again, anecdotal evidence of the supposed superiority of guanxi networks serves as the argument for the differential advantage of Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa (taking the example of Kenya, see Ramachand and Shah 1999: 74) .
In contrast, Storey and others assume that there is a cross-cultural diffusion of management practices (Storey et al. 2008: 464) . In their view, Asian business networks such as the guanxi are, in the globalized world, bound to mix with similar African networks. They hold Nigerian immigrants in Accra and Niamey, she concludes that overly strong cultural similarities between immigrants and a host society tend to worsen immigrant-host relations and social integration. Host-country citizens tend to reject those migrants whom they fear will easily blend in and thus better compete for scarce resources.
Chinese Migrant Entrepreneurs in West Africa
Chinese Migrant Entrepreneurs in Ghana
Chinese migration to Ghana has a long history. It began in colonial times and blossomed during the early days of Ghanaʹs independence, when Chinese citizens, mainly from Hong Kong, were lured by the Nkrumah government and its promise of a flourishing economy in the English-speaking Commonwealth country (Ho 2008a: 9-10; 2008: 55-56; Mohan and TanMullins 2009: 598) . As was the case elsewhere in Africa, however, the substantial influx of mainland Chinese only began in the late 1990s, for the reasons mentioned above. Today between 6,000 and 20,000 Chinese live in Ghana, mainly in the coastal urban areas of Accra, Tema, and Takoradi (Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009: 591) . 4 For most Chinese migrants, moving abroad has signified progress and modernity; they have aimed to distance themselves from the cultural practices, traditions, and politics at home, which they have viewed as being in opposition to an enlightened (Western) imagination of modernity which they themselves share. However, China's recent rise as a major global player, which is also obeying the rules of global capitalism, could convince them to consider returning home eventually. They may take it as an indicator that China's "anachronistic" values are beginning to fade out (Ho 2008: 52-53) . This new option for circular migration should nonetheless still enhance Chinese entrepreneurs' propensity to migrate to Africa.
However, the innovative drive of the first waves of Chinese entrepreneurial migrants in Ghana until the 1980s, focused on the manufacturing and service sectors, is beyond question.
These migrants were truly globally active entrepreneurs. They were keenly aware of, and switched between, temporary lucrative business opportunities, including (illegal) foreign exchange transactions, as shown by Conal Ho's detailed case studies, which cannot be presented here because of a lack of space (Ho 2008: 57-71) . These cases also demonstrate that self-interested individual agency and profit orientation, even when they are innovative, do not necessarily contribute to the wealth of a nation as Adam Smith thought.
Whether the new wave of overwhelmingly small-scale Chinese entrepreneurs in Ghana shares the same innovative drive as its predecessors is not known. Certainly, the massive inflow of FDI and the growth of Chinese imports in Ghana mentioned above has also been beneficial for these migrants. However, the business climate in Ghana has changed considerably, among other reasons because the legal framework for expatriates has become more restrictive, because competition has increased, and because the disposable resources of the newcomers are considerably lower than in the past. Taken together these factors have also impacted the effectiveness of the migrantsʹ own trading networks, not least because of heightened suspicion on the part of Chinese migrants vis-à-vis outsiders-even those from their own country-in view of the class divide between different networks of Chinese immigrants and the informal business transactions in which most of them are involved (ibid.: 60-61).
If one were to believe the local media, especially the Ghanaian tabloid press, most Chinese entrepreneurs in Ghana today are involved-certainly to differing degrees-in irregular activities, most notably in illegal retail, which is apparently often covered up by a shop fronted by a Ghanaian counterpart (Liu 2010:193, 196) . In recent years Chinese entrepreneurs have also entered into small-scale gold mining, known locally as galamsey. Small-scale mining was legalized in 1989 by the Small-Scale Mining Law. However, 95 percent of such mining activities-through which an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 workers, mostly Ghanaian but also foreign, earn their living, particularly in the Western Region-have remained informal.
Chinese gold miners, sometimes backed by local traditional chiefs, have entered the trade by providing funding and employing heavy equipment for illegal mining operations under the guise of providing services to small-scale miners. 5 This has threatened Ghanaian miners, who lack the resources necessary to challenge the Chinese competition. 6 Incidentally, it is by no means only the Chinese who have violated Ghanaian regulations restricting the activities of expatriates; major culprits convicted in 2007 also came from Nigeria, India, Germany, and the Netherlands (Baah et al. 2009: 97, fn 10 ). Yet besides Chinese traders, it is Nigerians who have actually been targeted most often by the Ghana Investment Promotion Center's (GIPC) task force against illegal retail trading. 7 In principle, Chinese and other foreign nationals are now allowed to be active in the manufacturing, service, and wholesaling sectors. In order to protect the national labor market, the Ghana In- 
Chinese Migrant Entrepreneurs in Benin
Chinese entrepreneurs, workers, and academics have been present in Benin for about three decades already. Their presence has been interpreted as a side effect of good diplomatic relations between Peking and Mathieu Kérékou's Marxist government (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) . 10 However, as elsewhere, the boom in Sino-Beninese business relations started only about ten years ago.
According to informed estimates, only 700 Chinese lived in Benin in the early 1980s, but this number had increased to 1,000 in 2000 and more than 2,700 in 2004.
In the early years of this century, China became Benin's second-biggest trading partner employers' caginess and lack of trust, or poor labor relations (ibid.: 34). According to Mounmouni, Chinese employers in West Africa (and elsewhere) have a traditionally minded topdown management style, which is shaped by massive prejudices towards African workers: the latter are assumed to be lazy, lacking in ambition, and needing to be controlled and coerced into delivering their maximal effort; this apparently applies also to Benin. As a consequence, most Chinese managers miss many opportunities to make good use of the potential creativity and engagement of their local African workforce (Mounmouni 2010: 29) . However, whether this traditionally minded attitude is also held by small-scale Chinese migrant entrepreneurs, who mostly employ family labor-and only if needed an African counterpart or one to two additional local workers-is debatable.
On the other hand, as is the case overall in Africa ), entrepreneurs from Benin complain about the allegedly "disloyal" competition generated by Chinese-made cloth (including the illegal copying of designs), which they hold responsible for the ailing textile industry. Many Beninese entrepreneurs see this as an untenable condition in view of the fact that their country is the second-largest cotton producer in sub-Saharan Africa. Certainly, the crashing of two major textile factories, SITEX and CBT, at Lokossa, both joint ventures of Benin and China which were mismanaged and incapable of withstanding the pressure of cheap imports of Chinese clothes, intensified these fears. 13 This is why Beninese businesspeople consider China to be both a "predator and partner of Beninʹs textile industry" (Mounmouni 2010: 37) . Many textile vendors at Cotonouʹs large international Dantokpa Market are also in conflict with their Chinese (and Pakistani) competitors, who also engage in retailing. 14 Particularly because both trading diasporas allegedly import Chinese-made counterfeits of textile trademarks, such as Vlisco, Super Wax, or Mandras, or smuggle textiles from neighboring Togo (ibid.: 35). 15 Another concern is the increasing smuggling of timber to China; it is cut illegally and thus contributes to the unsustainable deforestation of southern Benin. Although the government of Yayi Boni has suspended timber exports, some Chinese from Cotonou are allegedly still engaged in this irregular trade, taking advantage of the porous frontier with Togo and Nigeria (ibid.: 37).
Nevertheless, the division of labor between Chinese and African entrepreneurs in Benin tends to be complementary rather than competitive, as is the case elsewhere in Africa.
Whereas the Chinese profit from lower transaction costs for the import of goods, for example, because they are part of more effective business networks in China, their African counterparts have more efficient distribution networks on the demand side, particularly in retail trade and in the countryside (Dupré and Shi 2008: 38) .
Nigerian Migrant Diasporas in West Africa
Nigeria, with a population of approximately 150 million in 2008, accounts for more than half of the total population of West Africa. Therefore, it is not surprising that the country has a long and dynamic emigration history. Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba long-distance traders from regions which today constitute Nigeria have played a decisive role in the transregional networks of migrant entrepreneurs all over West Africa since pre-colonial times (Meillassoux 1971; Cohen 1971; Forrest 1994) . Most of the international migration in the subregion is embedded in the informal sector, which means there is a lack of exact data on the numbers and flows of Nigerian migrants in different West African countries. Case studies on Nigerian entrepreneurial migrants are, however, available for Benin (Martineau 2009 
Nigerian Migrant Entrepreneurs in Ghana
The first wave of Nigerian immigrants in Ghana were attracted by gold and diamond mining in the 1920s, and later by the growth of the cacao cash-crop economy. They were also drawn by the common colonial language and other cultural similarities. According to the Ghanaian census of 1948, approximately 46,800 Nigerians lived in Ghana at the time; their number rose to 100,000 in 1959 (Afolayan et al. 2008: 10) and 300,000 in 1969 (Eades 1993: 1) . 16 However, most of the entrepreneurial migrants had to leave in 1969 because of restrictive immigration laws introduced by the Ghanaian government, as explained in more detail below. According to World Bank estimates, some 56,000 Nigerians lived in Ghana at the end of the 1980s, 17 a number that has tripled again over the past two decades. According to joint estimates of the World Bank and the University of Sussex, the number of Nigerian migrants in Ghana at present is approximately 160,000. 18 16 Out of the estimated 300,000 persons of Nigerian origin in Ghana in 1969, 150,000 were Yoruba, 92,400 Hausa and 21,000 Igbo (Eades, 1993: 200, fn.1). 17 Cf. The history of Yoruba immigration to Ghana is probably one of the best-documented incidences of the growth and (sudden) decline of a diaspora of enterprising Nigerians in Africa between the first and second world wars: groups of enterprising Yoruba traders from a few towns in Western Nigeria had established a remarkably successful trading network throughout the Gold Coast (Ghana). Using information, skills and capital generated mainly within the family, what grew to become the largest groups of immigrant traders in the country had spread to even the most remote rural areas, becoming a powerful force in the Ghanaian markets. (Eades 1993: cover text) However, the domination of Ghana's central trade institutions by these "Lagosians," as Yoruba immigrant traders were commonly called in Ghana, was met with growing resentment against strangers. This resistance culminated in the Alien Compliance Order of 1969, which ordered all irregular migrants to leave Ghana at short notice. Thus, almost all of the 150,000 Nigerian Yoruba living in Ghana at that time were expelled within two weeks (Eades 1993: 1, 196, 200 ).
Eades's account "from below" of Nigerian Yoruba entrepreneurs, both men and women, in Northern Ghana is most illustrative. It highlights the fact that these immigrants were quick to respond to new economic opportunities and incentives, even in remote areas and in the most unusual settings, over a period of six decades. Many of them drew value from their own resources, relying extensively on low-cost family rather than wage labor, and created flourishing enterprises without demanding public subsidies. In short, they were inventive agents of change pursuing development strategies, although these migrants too were certainly focused primarily on their own well-being (ibid.: 107-139,196 ).
Nigerian migrant associations, which were most often intimately related to their members' hometowns, played a central role in orientating their members, in organizing and improving these members' livelihood, and in facilitating their integration into the host society.
As a rule, these transnational social networks did not aim explicitly to enhance economic development. Yet through their social activities they became effective development agents in Ghana, as a case study of Nigerian migrant associations in Accra by Thomas Antwi Bosiakoh (2009: 1, 13-14) demonstrates. These associations can be regarded as an expression of Nigerian entrepreneurial migrants' specific culture of innovation in Ghana, something which gave them a competitive edge vis-à-vis their Ghanaian competitors. The strong influence of Nigerian (Neo-)Pentecostalism, which takes prosperity as a sign of faith and divine recognition, on the Nigerian diaspora in Ghana (Moyet 2005: 476) may have added to the community's competitive advantage. Even more so because the Pentecostal discourse in Ghana reveals the assumed special dangers inherent in commodities of strange origin, claiming at the same time to possess the remedy to overcome the ugly powers of globalization (Kamphausen 2000) . However, neither the Pentecostal orientation nor the use of hometown associations are specific Nigerian cultural strategies in the organization of trading diasporas. They are common to other African, and even to Chinese, migrant entrepreneurs. (2008) suggests, the latter feared that this closeness could make them redundant even more easily. Political pressure on the part of interest groups for the exclusion of foreigners in the "national interest" is thus nothing new, but it is apparently undergoing a revival with the current spread of a new nationalism all over Africa (Kohnert 2007) .
Nigerian Migrant Entrepreneurs in Benin
The presence of Nigerians in Benin dates back to pre-colonial times, when the Yoruba king- tional cultures of innovation do exist in the migrants' respective home countries, this would not necessarily mean that these migrants act in a similar way beyond their own national borders, for example, uprooted and transplanted into trading diasporas within a foreign cultural environment, far away from their customary cultural home.
Alternatively, in order to test the articulation of the Chinese and Nigerian entrepreneurial diasporas in Africa, we could take as a second proxy the relationships of Nigerian migrant entrepreneurs in China to their local Chinese counterparts, which is just the inverse of the first proxy. In fact, there are an increasing number of African, particularly Nigerian, migrant entrepreneurs in China. 20 The few available studies on this relatively new phenomenon (Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2009: 55-60; Rennie, 2010; Onos, 2009 ) again do not deliver any clues about the superiority of a national Nigerian (or Chinese) innovation culture, although guanxi networks have again been mentioned as a peculiar Chinese cultural trait which must be observed by African entrepreneurs (Horwitz et al. 2005) , a notion which is highly controversial, as explained above.
Conclusion: The Comparative Value of Trading Diasporasʹ Innovative Cultures in West Africa
Chinese and African entrepreneurial diasporas are culturally distinct from their societies of origin as well as from those of their host communities. A strong capacity to adapt to rapidly changing living conditions and business opportunities-not just in the host country but also on a global scale-is a precondition for success for both groups of ethnic entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, their business strategies and modes of survival differ significantly, with due regard to the demands of both the host country and the respective transnational diaspora in which they are embedded. Although most of these entrepreneurial diasporas are not as homogenous as they may appear at first glance, but are rather characterized by significant divisions according to class, gender, and even ethnic composition, they more often than not develop their own distinctive cultures. Such a common culture is not simply an ideology which welds together a moral community (Cohen 1971: 266-67) , that is, a culture of identity that acts as a kind of glue for the different factions of the diaspora in order to bridge or hide their internal divides. Under certain conditions it also becomes an enabling culture of innovation that provides its members with a distinctive drive for change and modernization. This culture may include a remarkable capacity for institutional innovations across kinship and community frontiers, similar to that observed by Kate Meagher in her study of Igbo entrepreneurial networks and their liaisons with other ethnic trading diasporas, which contribute to nation 20 According to informed estimates between 20,000 and 120,000 Africans live in the Guangzhou region alone.
Again, reliable data are lacking because of the irregular status of most African migrants (see Bertoncello and Bredeloup 2009: 55) .
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Dirk Kohnert: Comparing Chinese and Nigerian Entrepreneurial Migrants' Cultures of Innovation building "from below" in Nigeria (Meagher 2009: 35) . However, the growth of cultures of innovation does not seem to be a unilateral path-dependent development, let alone a planned process, but rather the result of a long path of trial and error. Furthermore, although most trading diaspora cultures have a distinctive creative impetus which stimulates ingenuity, change, and an entrepreneurial spirit, not all of them are simultaneously innovative, that is, embedded in social processes and networks that effectively disseminate particular inventions. Even if they are, they are not necessarily development oriented in the sense mentioned above.
Notwithstanding the growing divide between today's Chinese entrepreneurial diasporas (or Nigerian entrepreneurial migrants in Ghana in the 1960s) on the one hand and rival groups of local entrepreneurs on the other-a divide fueled by the identity politics of a new nationalist elite keen to consolidate its power and resources-there has been long-standing, effective collaboration at the grassroots level between the different trading diasporas. This collaboration is based on the division of labor and on the comparative advantage of each group's innovation culture. Last but not least, this cooperation has also contributed to nationwide poverty reduction, particularly through the provision of cheap basic consumer goods to even the most remote corners of the hinterland.
